Appellant Department of Motor Vehicles sought review of a judgment of the Superior Court of Contra Costa County

 

Appellant Department of Motor Vehicles sought review of a judgment of the Superior Court of Contra Costa County (California), which pursuant to caljic jury instructions online, Cal. Civ. Proc. § 1094.5 ordered the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing appellant to set aside its decision revoking the license of respondent car dealer.

 

 

 

Respondent car dealer was convicted of violation of Cal. Penal Code § 647a, annoying or molesting a child, a crime of moral turpitude. Appellant Department of Motor Vehicles revoked his license to sell automobiles pursuant to Cal. Veh. Code § 11806, which permitted revocation of a license if the licensee was found to lack good moral character. The trial court issued a writ of mandamus ordering appellant to set aside the decision to revoke respondent's license because there was no nexus between respondent's crime and the business of selling cars. The reviewing court held that appellant had statutory authority to revoke respondent's license. The court found that while conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude was some evidence that respondent was not of good moral character, appellant failed to present any evidence to establish a nexus between the criminal conduct and activities as a salesman. Finally, appellant could not complain that respondent's objections before the administrative law judge prevented introduction of evidence to show the nexus, because appellant failed to introduce such evidence before the trial court. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment.

 

 

 

The court affirmed the trial court's writ of mandamus ordering appellant Department of Motor Vehicles to set aside the revocation of respondent car dealer's license. Although appellant had statutory authority to revoke a license if a licensee lacked good moral character, there was no nexus between respondent's crime and the business of selling cars.

 

Defendant, whose medical license had been revoked in California and New York, created a website that looked like the website of plaintiff vascular surgeon, who sued defendant for, inter alia, defamation. The Los Angeles County Superior Court, California, entered a default judgment in favor of plaintiff and awarded him punitive damages. Defendant appealed.

 

 

 

The court concluded that the statements made by defendant in her counterfeit website damaged plaintiff's reputation and were actionable. Plaintiff was a fully licensed, practicing physician specializing in general and vascular surgery with all of the necessary medical training to perform surgeries. He was not a student. However, the counterfeit website stated that plaintiff had no specialized medical training in medicine or in female medicine and that he was a vascular student. The false import of those statements was that plaintiff was not a licensed physician and did not have the educational background to perform the procedures he promoted. The statements in the counterfeit website cast serious doubt on plaintiff's professional ability and were defamatory under Civ. Code, § 46(3). The trial court had the jurisdiction to strike defendant's answer and enter default against defendant. From the start of the case to the time the trial court struck defendant's answer and entered default, defendant showed no interest in taking part in the case or in following orders of the trial court. All of defendant's actions were those of an obstructionist, not a participant in the process.

 

 

 

The judgment was reversed with respect to the award of punitive damages because there was no proof of defendant's financial condition, but the judgment was affirmed in all other respects. The matter was remanded to the trial court with directions to strike the award of punitive damages.